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THE IMPLICATION OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION AGAINST COERCION UNDER THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
Unlike other major federal labor legislation, the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA) lacks a statutory provision prohibiting employers' retaliatory acts
against employees who resort to statutory processes and remedies. Consequently,
employers' coercive tactics often discourage employees from pursuing their statuto-
rily guaranteed rights. To prevent this impermissible chill on rights created by Con-
gress, this Note advocates implying a private right of action under Section 51 of the
FELA. Drawing from analogous federal labor legislation, the Note proposes the
appropriate analytical framework under which to consider the employer's alleged
coercive conduct. The Note concludes with a discussion of the possible remedies
available to the aggrieved claimant.
INTRODUCTION
RAILROADING IS AN extremely hazardous occupation.' Sta-
tistics demonstrating a substantial decrease in the number of
deaths and injuries of railroad workers since the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act (FELA) was enacted2 suggest that the Act has
had a favorable impact on railroad safety.3 In Justice Douglas'
words, "[tjhe Federal Employers' Liability Act was designed to
put on the railroad industry some of the cost for the legs, eyes,
arms and lives which it consumed in its operations."4
Section 51 of the FELA provides:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in cor-
1. See Norton, Federal Employers Liability Act-The Unusual Case, TRIAL, Mar.,
1978, at 42. In 1907, one year before the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) was
passed, 4,534 railroad employees were killed and 87,634 were injured. Lewis, The Federal
Employers Liability Act, 14 S.C.L.Q. 447 (1962). In 1950, although more people were en-
gaged in railroad work, only 329 were killed and 22,000 were injured. Id. at 447. There
were 101 fatalities in 1979 and approximately 55,000 employee injuries. Federal Railroad
Administration, OFFICE OF SAFETY, ACCIDENT INCIDENT BULLETIN 148 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ACCIDENT INCIDENT BULLETIN].
2. FELA, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) (held unconstitutional); Second Employers'
Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976)).
3. Many factors in addition to the enactment of the FELA may have influenced this
pattern. Most obvious are improvements in railroad equipment and the promulgation of
explicit safety requirements. Comment, The Construction of Indemnity Agreements Under
the Federal Employers Liability Act: .A Conflict of Public Policy and Contract Law, 38 MD.
L. Rav. 71, 102 (1978). The increase in injuries may be due in part to the increase in man-
hours worked, train miles operated, and the biannual adjustment of the dollar threshold
used to determine which accidents must be reported, which does not track the rate of infla-
tion. See ACCIDENT INCIDENT BULLETIN, supra note 1.
4. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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merce between any of the several states. . . shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by
such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of death of such em-
ployee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of
the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee
. . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from
the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track,
roadbed. . . or other equipment.
Thus, section 51 of the FELA promotes safety by awarding dam-
ages to negligently injured workers.6
The courts provide the only forum empowered to enforce the
respective rights of the employer and employee under the FELA.7
Employees rarely litigate FELA claims, however, because the
courts present many barriers.' Most claims, therefore, are settled
through a bargaining process removed from the act's spirit.9
Threats, coercion, and economic pressure constitute important
factors in the "adjustment" of many claims.'"
Sections 55 and 60 of the FELA guard against potential em-
ployer abuses in settling employee claims. Section 60 proscribes
disciplining an employee for voluntarily furnishing information in
FELA cases." Section 55 prohibits contractual exemption from
FELA liability: "Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatso-
ever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any com-
mon carrier to exempt itself from liability created by this act, shall
to that extent be void ... .'"I While section 55 is susceptible to
expansive interpretation by construing the word "device"
broadly,' the courts have held uniformly that the application of
section 55 is limited to actual contracts or releases.' 4 Abusive con-
5. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
6. Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 387 (W.D. Mich. 1970), aj'd
inpart and vacated inpart, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
7. Pollack, The Crisis In Work Injury Compensation On and Off the Railroadr, 18
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 296, 305 (1953).
8. Id. Employees, for example, may fear that filing suit will jeopardize job tenure.
Moreover, fellow employees who could serve as witnesses often share the same concern.
Id.
9. Id. at 306.
10. Id.
11. 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1976).
12. Id. § 55.
13. Comment, supra note 3, at 99.
14. See, eg., Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 383-85 (W.D. Mich.
1970), atfd in part and vacated in part, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971); Richter & Forer,
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 12 F.R.D. 13, 53 (1952).
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duct designed to defeat just claims of employees, therefore, goes
unchecked when the railroad's efforts fail to produce an actual
agreement. The result is an impermissible chill on congressionally
created rights. 5
This Note examines three federal acts which protect human
rights in the employment context.' 6 Each act contains a provision
prohibiting retaliatory acts against employees who resort to statu-
tory processes and remedies.' 7 The FELA contains no such prohi-
bition. Without this prohibition, the right to file a FELA claim is
threatened because claimants can be harassed or even discharged
if they pursue their statutory remedy.
This Note demonstrates that coercion by railroads against
their injured employees may be actionable by implying a private
right of action against such tactics under section 51 of the FELA.I8
Drawing from the analogous federal acts which statutorily pro-
scribe employer retaliation against claimants, the Note suggests
the appropriate analytical framework under which to consider the
employer's alleged coercive activities once a right of action is es-
tablished.' 9 Finally, the Note suggests possible remedies available
to such claimants.20
I. THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
Congress passed the initial FELA in 190621 "to equalize the
positions of the employee and carrier before the law."22 This act
15. See Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. at 385.
16. See infra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
17. These acts are the Civil Rights Act, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976); Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976); Fair Labor
Standards Act, § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976). For an explanation of the purpose
of these sections see Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960); NLRB v.
Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 480 F.2d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464
F.2d 1326, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005
(5th Cir. 1969).
18. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
21. FELA, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906).
22. Richter & Forer, supra note 14, at 57. Following passage of the Act, one of its
authors, Edward A. Moseley, became concerned about a forthcoming campaign against the
Act by railroad lawyers. Griffith, The Vindication of a National Public Policy Under the
Federal Employers' Liabilty Act, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 160, 170 (1953). Mr. Mose-
ley requested the intervention of the Justice Department on behalf of the legislation. Id. In
announcing the government's decision to intervene in defense of the law, Mr. Moseley
stated:
I regard this action as one of the most important events in the interest of labor
that has ever occurred. Were railway employees, who seek to obtain damages for
[Vol. 32:992
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abolished the "fellow servant" rule and modified the "contribu-
tory negligence" rule which often insulated the railroad from lia-
bility arising from unsafe working conditions.23 The law was
applicable to all railroad employees engaged in interstate com-
merce, without regard to whether the particular employee was en-
gaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury.24 The
Supreme Court almost immediately held the law unconstitutional
because it interfered with the powers reserved to the states.
25
President Theodore Roosevelt urged the adoption of a second
FELA to correct the common law's manifest unfairness in meeting
the injured worker's needs.26 The president declared, "The prac-
tice of putting the entire burden of loss of life or limb upon the
victim or victim's family is a form of social injustice in which the
United States stands in unenviable prominence. '27 The Supreme
Court upheld the act's constitutionality in the Second Employers'
Liabili y Cases.28  These legislative efforts yield a singularly im-
portant conclusion-the FELA was designed to promote adequate
injuries received, left to their own resources there is no question that the benefits
which this law seeks to confer upon them would be neutralized or entirely de-
stroyed by the action of the courts.
The railroad companies have the strongest array of legal talent in the country,
and this talent will all be directed toward defeating the ends of any such law as this.
No private individual can hope to cope with such power, it will be impossible for
any railway employee, who invokes the aid of this law, to employ attorneys who
can successfully meet the arguments of counsel for the railroad companies. But
with the resources of the Department of Justice placed at his command, in order
to protect the integrity of the law, the railway employee is placed on a plane of
practical equality with the railway company, and he is thus insured a square deal.
Id. at 171 (emphasis added) (quoting J. MORGAN, THE LIFE WORK OF EDWARD A.
MOSELEY IN THE SERVICE OF HUMANITY 110 (1913)).
23. See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring). The
"fellow servant" doctrine absolves an employer from liability to an employee whose inju-
ries resulted from the negligence of other employees engaged in the same general type of
work. See, ag., New England Ry. Co. v. Conroy, 175 U.S. 323 (1899). Contributory negli-
gence on the part of a plaintiff bars recovery for his or her injuries or death. See Brakensiek
v. Nickles, 216 Ark. 889, 227 S.W.2d 948 (1950). Under the FELA, contributory negligence
serves only to diminish the damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the employee. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 451. Assumption of the risk, whereby an
employee assumes the ordinary risks incident to his or her employment, was eliminated by
the 1939 amendments to the Act. Act of Aug. 11, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-382, § 1, 53 Stat.
1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1976)).
24. Miller, The Quest for a Federal Workmens' Compensation Law for Railroad Em-
ployees, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 188, 189 (1953).
25. The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908). See Miller supra note 24, at
189.
26. Richter & Forer, supra note 14, at 15.
27. 42 CONo. REC. 73 (1907).
28. 223 U.S. 1 (1911) (Congress may regulate relations between common carriers by
railway and their employees only while both are engaged in interstate commerce).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
recovery for negligently injured railroad workers, thus promoting
safe operating conditions.2 9
An employee seeking relief under the FELA today must be
engaged in work which relates to interstate commerce. 30 Prior to
1939, the courts found it difficult to separate the duties of employ-
ees and classify them as either interstate or intrastate.3' This diffi-
culty was ameliorated by an amendment to the FELA in 1939
which broadened the act to include all activities which further or
directly or closely and substantially affect interstate commerce.32
Thus, if the task performed by the employee at the time of the
injury is regarded as part of interstate commerce, the FELA pro-
vides the exclusive remedy.33
In defining an interstate carrier's liability, the FELA requires
that the employee's injury or death result in whole or part from
the carrier's negligence. 34 The act imposes a continuing nondele-
gable duty on railroad companies to furnish a safe workplace for
its employees 35-a duty which becomes more imperative as the
risk increases.36 This duty is not narrowly confined but extends to
any defect that makes the workplace unsafe.37 Failure to provide a
29. See Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. at 387.
30. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
31. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 535 (4th ed. 1971).
32. Act of Aug. 11, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-382, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 51, 54, 56, 60); W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 535; see Reed v. Pennsylvania RtR., 351
U.S. 502 (1956). Reed involved a woman who worked in an office building whose duties
consisted of filing and recovering original tracings of machinery from which blueprints
were made. She was injured when a cracked window pane blew in during a high wind. Her
work was held to be in furtherance of interstate commerce, and she recovered under the
FELA. After Reed, it appears that all railroad employees are covered under the FELA.
One commentator noted, "Implicit ... in Reed is the assumption that if an employee's
duties did not bear a close and substantial relation to the interstate transportation of goods,
the railroad would not have hired him." Norton, supra note 1, at 44 (emphasis added). See
also Southern Pac. Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. 493 (1956) (railroad employee, injured in rail-
road yard opened to interstate commerce four months after the accident, covered by the
FELA); Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947) (complaint which alleged that the circum-
stances of the railroad employee's work created likelihood that she would suffer injuries
through the criminal acts of a nonrailroad employee and that the railroad employer failed
to protect employee stated an FELA cause of action).
33. Since Congress had occupied the field, the FELA operates to the exclusion of all
state remedies. New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 149 (1917); W. PROSSER,
supra note 31, at 535. If a plaintiff chooses to bring an FELA suit in a state court rather
than in federal court pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 56 (the jurisdiction of the federal courts is
concurrent with that of the several states), the state court must apply federal law. See Urie
v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44 (1931).
34. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
35. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 449.
36. Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
37. This duty follows wherever the employee is sent to work, whether on the coin-
[Vol. 32:992
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safe workplace, therefore, is probably the most common ground
for proving negligence in an FELA case. 38
Exceptions to the requirement of showing negligence exist
where the employee can identify some violation of the Safety Ap-
pliance Acts39 or the Boiler Inspection Act.4° These acts impose
absolute and mandatory duties on the carrier to maintain equip-
ment in a prescribed condition.4  A violation of either the Safety
Appliance Acts or the Boiler Inspection Act is unlawful and sub-
jects the offending carrier to a fine.42 Violation of these statutes
does not create a cause of action for the injured employee; rather,
the right to sue the carrier is found in the FELA.43 Since the duty
imposed by these acts is absolute, the FELA claimant establishes a
case by showing that the defective appliance subject to the Safety
Appliance Acts or the Boiler Inspection Act caused injury "in
whole or part."'
The common law concept of proximate cause is displaced in
FELA actions by the concept of causal connection.4' Since the
adoption of the 1939 amendments, the courts have construed the
causal relation requirement liberally.' Following a series of deci-
sions in which the question of the railroad's negligence went to the
jury based on circumstantial or sketchy evidence,4 7 the Supreme
pany's premises or not, and whether the employer has control of the premises or not.
Lewis, supra note 1, at 449. For a review of cases construing the duty to provide a safe
place to work, see Funkhauser, What is a Safe Place to Work Under the FEL.4., 17 OHIO
ST. L.J. 367 (1956).
38. See Funkhauser, supra note 41, at 33.
39. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976).
40. Id. §§ 22-34.
41. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 452-55; Richter & Forer, supra note 14, at 40-48.
42. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 13, 34 (1976).
43. See Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & Hartford R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953);
aj'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 909 (1954); Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205
(1934); Lewis, supra note 1, at 452.
44. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,432 (1957). Common law refine-
ments of proximate cause need not be satisfied. It is necessary only to show that the appli-
ance failed to properly function when used in the usual and ordinary manner. See Myers
v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1947) (test is the performance of the appliance);
Lewis, supra note 1, at 453.
45. See, eg., Webb v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 352 U.S. 512, 521 (1957); Arnold v. Panhan-
dle & Santa Fe Ry., 353 U.S. 360 (1957); Thomson v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 353 U.S. 926
(1957).
46. See Steinberg, The Federal Employers' Liability Act and Judicial Activism Poli-
cymaldng by the Courts, 12 WmLAm rrE L.J. 79, 85 (1975).
47. Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321 U.S. 29 (1944); Bailey v. Central Vt.
Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Hayes v. Wabash R.R. Co., 360 Mo. 1223,233 S.W.2d 12 (1950);
Sadowski v. Long Island R.R. Co., 292 N.Y. 448, 55 N.E.2d 497 (1944). See W. PROSSEt,
supra note 31, at 536.
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Court ruled that causal connection is shown in a FELA case when
"the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negli-
gence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or
death for which damages are sought."48
Some critics contend that this interpretation has transformed
the FELA into a workers' compensation statute.49 The Supreme
Court confronted this argument in Wilkerson v. McCarthy50 and
stated that the FELA "does not make the railroad an absolute in-
surer against personal injury damages suffered by its employees
... since the Act imposes liability only for negligent injuries.'
While the courts have reduced the extent of negligence required in
an ordinary common law negligence action, as well as the quan-
tum of proof necessaryjto establish that negligence, there must be
some shred of negligence and causation;52 "[s]peculation, conjec-
ture and possibilities"53 will be insufficient.
Benefits under the FELA accrue only to those workers or their
beneficiaries who successfully invoke its provisions.14 Unfortu-
nately, many factors have discouraged resort to FELA relief.5 5
According to one commentator, most employees are apprehensive
about "starting trouble" with the railroad, fearing that initiating
court proceedings against the employer will jeopardize their fu-
48. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (emphasis added). The
rationale for the Court's liberal approach, which culminated in the Rogers test, was based
largely on the humanitarian and remedial nature of the FELA. "This statute. . . was a
response to the special needs of railroad workers who are daily exposed to the risks inher-
ent in railroad work and are helpless to provide adequately for their own safety." Sinkler v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 356 U.S. 326, 329 (1958). The Court recognized that the amounts
railroads pay to injured employees might be passed on to the public as a cost of doing
business. The Court, therefore, concluded that the equities of the situation demanded that
the employee collect if he or she could prove that employer negligence played any role in
the injury. Id. at 329-30. See Steinberg, supra note 46, at 82-85.
49. Note, Supreme Court Certiorari Policy in Cases Arising Under FELA, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 1441, 1447-50 (1956); Note, Federal Employers' Liability Act: Apostasy of Sufflciency
of Evidence Policy, 42 MIss. L.J. 418, 423 (1971); Comment, The FederalEmployers'Liabil-
ityAct-A Plea/or Reform, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 112, 113 (1969) (concluding that the Court
has modernized the FELA in the direction of strict liability); Comment, FederalEmployers'
Liability Act-Certiorari Practice-Review ofthe Sufficiency of Evidence, 6 VILL. L. REV.
549, 557 (1961).
50. 336 U.S. 53 (1949).
51. Id. at 61.
52. W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 536.
53. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 897 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., memoran-
dum opinion denying cert.).
54. See Griffith, supra note 22, at 170.
55. See id. at 170-72; Pollack, Workmen's Compensationfor Work Injuries and Dis-
eases, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 236, 240-41 (1950).
[Vol. 32:992
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ture employment. 6 This fear of retaliatory discharge renders
many employees vulnerable to employer coercion.
5 7
Thus, FELA claims are settled out-of-court 58-a process that
was not contemplated by the act's framers.5 9 The claimant in this
settlement process acts alone or with the occasional assistance of a
trade union official6" and often faces the financial impact of inter-
rupted or severed income.6' The employer, however, is repre-
sented by an experienced claim agent with access to vastly greater
resources with which to process the case.6 2 Consequently, equita-
ble payments typically do not result from out-of-court negotia-
tions. Moreover, confronting a period of interrupted income,
uncertainty, and anxiety about the future, employees may prefer
insufficient payments to the delays and uncertainties of litiga-
56. Pollack, supra note 55, at 240. See also RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, WORK
INJURIES IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY, 1938-40 (1947). Despite many assurances and safe-
guards, the Railroad Retirement Board found a widespread belief among injured employ-
ees that to bring a claim to court is to invite dismissal. This threat is used frequently by
railroad claim agents in dissuading employees from filing suit or even engaging an attor-
ney. Moreover, confirmation that actual practice justified such fears was demonstrated
statistically in an analysis of actual returns to work in relation to whether an attorney had
been hired or the case brought to court.
Other employer sanctions, short of discharge, for "starting trouble" include reduced
compensation, unfavorable work assignments, inconvenient and frequent transfers, or fore-
closure from advancement. See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1406 (1967).
Such harrassment may be aggravated to a point where it is the practical equivalent of
discharge. Id.
57. Blades, supra note 56, at 1406. As a nation of employees, "[w]e are dependent
upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have become completely
dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every resource . . . . For our
generation, the substance of Li/e is in another man's hands." Id. at 1404 (quoting F. TAN-
NENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (emphasis added)).
58. One study found that only two percent of all FELA claims were actually litigated.Conrad, W'oraen's Compensation: Is It More E ffTcient Than Employer's Liability?, 38
A.B.AJ. 1011, 1014 (1952). Furthermore, the courts passed judgment on only a fraction of
those cases. Id.
59. See Pollack, supra note 55, at 237, 242-45. The entire purpose of the Act was to
equalize the positions of the employee and carrier before the law. See supra note 22.
60. Pollack, supra note 7, at 306.
61. See, e.g., Apitsch v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R.R., 385 F. Supp. 495 (D. Md.
1974).
62. Pollack, supra note 7, at 306. Persuasion, threats, and misrepresentations are im-
portant factors in the "adjustment" of many claims. Offers to employees are often coupled
with a maximum of pressure to secure their acceptance. Id. See, e.g., Apitsch v. Patapsco
& Back Rivers R.R., 385 F. Supp. at 498 (railroad company had systematically solicited
defective releases and agreements from injured employees for many years); Kozar v. Ches-
apeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 387 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (noting that coercive tactics
applied to claimant were part of management policy) aff'd inpart and vacated in part, 449
F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
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tion.63 Payments under FELA are thus comparatively low when
contrasted with payments from non-FELA settlements over a
given time period.64
Sections 55 and 60 guard against employer abuses in the settle-
ment process.6- Railroad employees theoretically are protected
against economic coercion by section 55 which provides that
"[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsover, the purpose
or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to ex-
empt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that
extent be void . . ".., Section 55, therefore, voids releases or
other exculpatory devices procured in an attempt to evade FELA
liability. Section 55, however, does not bar a valid release used
in settling a liability claim. 68  Nevertheless, such releases are
closely scrutinized by the courts since the release operates as a
waiver of a federally created right.69
In practice, section 55 falls short of its guarantee against em-
ployer coercion. When an employer exempts itself from full lia-
bility by less tangible means than an actual contract or release,
courts may not recognize that the forbidden end was achieved.70
Even if such a settlement were recognized as a section 55 device,7 '
63. Pollack, supra note 7, at 307. See, e.g., Apitsch v. Patapsco & Back Rivers R.R.,
385 F. Supp. at 499.
64. Pollack, supra note 7, at 311.
65. See cases cited in supra note 62 for examples. of such employer abuse. See, eg.,
Hendley v. Central of Ga. R.R., 609 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1980) (disciplinary procedure to
determine whether employee was guilty of disloyalty in connection with assisting co-em-
ployee in FELA suit held violative of § 60).
66. 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1976).
67. See Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. at 384-85; 42 CONG. REc.
4527 (1908).
68. See Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625, 631 (1948).
69. See South Buff. Ry. v. Ahem, 344 U.S. 367 (1953).
70. Richter & Forer, supra note 14, at 53. See, e.g., Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332
U.S. 625 (1948) (release of claims against the railroad held to be a compromise and not a
contract of exemption). The district court noted in Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320
F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970): "[The facts indicated] a strong probability that, from the
moment of [Mr. Kozar's] death, his employer adopted some rather primitive means in an
attempt to defeat the just claim of his widow .... " Id. at 383. The court went on to note
that "had the railroad's efforts in this case produced an agreement or release by Mrs.
Kozar, the ... facts argue strongly against its survival under Section 55." Id. at 385.
71. In the workers' compensation area, the word "device" has been construed to in-
clude coercive conduct. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas. Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297
N.E.2d 425 (1973), where the court held that the threat of discharge was a device within the
statutory prohibition against a contract, agreement, rule, regulation, or other device reliev-
ing an employer of its obligation to compensate an eligible employee. The court found a
threat of discharge in clear contravention of public policy, because failure to construe "de-
vice" in this manner would be equivalent to "arming unethical employers with common
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section 55 merely would void the coerced settlement. Section 55
would not award consequential or punitive damages.7 2 This inad-
equacy indicates the need for an implied private right of action
against employer coercion under section 51 to insure that FELA
claimants will not be deprived unjustly of their section 51 remedy.
Beyond section 55's protection, section 60 prevents a railroad
from interfering with employees who give information to a claim-
ant concerning the facts incident to the injury or death of any em-
ployee.73 Section 60 imposes a penalty on any person who
attempts by contract, rule, regulation, threats, or intimidation to
prevent a person from voluntarily giving such information.74 This
section's purpose is to enable claimants to obtain all available in-
formation from witnesses, especially railroad employees.7 5 Rail-
road employees who consider testifying in a FELA case
understandably would hesitate to testify in the face of employer-
imposed sanctions and threatened job security.7 6
law authority." Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 428. Noting the well established tradition of
liberally construing the Workers' Compensation Act, the court stated:
The Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for work-related
injuries... and a right in the employee to receive such compensation. But in
order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for the public policy to be effectu-
ated, the employee must be able to exercise his right in an unfettered fashion
without being subject to reprisal. If employers are permitted to penalize employ-
ees for filing workmen's compensation claims, a most important public policy will
be undermined. The fear of being discharged would have a deleterious effect on
the exercise of a statutory right. Employees will not file claims for justly deserved
compensation--opting, instead, to continue their employment without incident.
The end result, of course, is that the employer is effectively relieved of his
obligation.
Id. at 251-52, 297 N.E.2d at 427. Because the purpose underlying both Workers' Compen-
sation and the FELA is to promote compensation for work related injuries, Frampton lends
support to the conclusion that employer coercion, intimidation, and economic pressure
constitute a device within the framework of FELA § 55.
72. The Supreme Court, in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11 (1979), construed Congress' declaration in § 215 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976), that certain contracts are void, to intend the customary legal
incidents of voidness to follow, including the remedies of recission, injunctive relief, and
restitution. 444 U.S. at 19. FELA claimants have contended, however, that § 55 also pro-
vides a private cause of action for damages to an employee victimized by § 55 devices.
Every court to address this contention has failed to imply such a cause of action. See Bay
v. Western Pac. R.R., 595 F.2d 514, 515 (9th Cir. 1979); Fullerton v. Monongahela Con-
necting R.R., 242 F. Supp. 622, 624 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Greenwood v. Achison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 129 F. Supp. 105, 107 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
73. Hendley v. Central of Ga. R.R., 609 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. A $1,000 fine and/or one year imprisonment are the penalties for discharging or
disciplining an employee who voluntarily furnishes information. 45 U.S.C. § 60 (1976).
Cf. Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 320 F. Supp. at 370 n.17 (§ 60 violations can be
remedied through the criminal process or in an action for equitable relief).
75. Dugger v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 5 F.R.D. 334, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
76. See Hendley v. Central of Ga. R.R., 609 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1980) (disciplinary
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Although the drafters of section 60 realized the danger of di-
rect coercion against railroad employees who testify in a FELA
action, they apparently failed to recognize this danger regarding
FELA claimants. The undisputed pressures applied to witnesses
by an aggressive and powerful railroad company seeking to defeat
the claims of injured employees presumably would be directed
against the actual claimant. This anomaly, like the inadequacy
within section 55, could be corrected by affording FELA claim-
ants relief under section 51 when coercive settlement tactics are
applied by the railroads in an attempt to affect an early and ineq-
uitable settlement.
II. FEDERAL LAWS WHICH PROSCRIBE
RETALIATORY CONDUCT
The courts and legislatures repeatedly have recognized that
threats, coercion, economic pressure, and retaliatory conduct are
illegal if they chill rights created by Congress.77 Although the
framers of the FELA did not implement a cause of action to pro-
tect employees from coercive tactics designed to discourage resort
to FELA remedies, subsequent legislative enactments and judicial
decisions indicate the need for such an action to insure the unin-
hibited exercise of the federally created rights.78
Within the employment context, Congress has recognized the
need to prohibit acts of retaliation against employees who resort
to statutory processes and remedies. Section 704(a) of the Civil
investigation to determine whether employee was guilty of disloyalty for allegedly assisting
a co-employee in a personal injury suit against the railroad violated § 60). In Kozar, the
district court recognized the intimidating effect of a railroad's exercise of power against an
FELA witness:
[R]ailroad employees are subject to considerable pressure if called to give testi-
mony against their employer. This pressure need not be the result of direct threats
of arm-twisting; it is not necessarily the object of deliberate railroad policy. But
whether by design or accident, the fact remains that these working men, through
numerous contacts with supervisors and claim agents during the discovery pro-
cess, often believe that a wrong step-defined by railroad rules (real or apparent)
and interpreted by railroad officials--may result in sanctions, and that wrong tes-
timony-potentially costing the railroad large amounts of money-might arouse
the displeasure of those in control of their livelihood. The tremendous power of a
corporation like the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad, coupled with its aggressive
efforts to defeat the claims of those injured by its activities--even when the vic-
tims are their most valuable employees-can overawe and even cower those indi-
viduals upon whom an opposing party must rely to substantiate his claim.
320 F. Supp. at 369-70 (footnote omitted).
77. See, e.g., Hendley v. Central of Ga. R.R., 442 F. Supp. 482 (D.C. Ga. 1977), rev'd
on other grounds, 609 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 614 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 815 (1981).
78. See infra notes 79-102 and accompanying text.
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Rights Act of 1964,79 section 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA), °8 and section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) 1 guarantee freedom from reprisal to persons
who invoke the aid of a federal agency. 2 Thus, the integrity of
the particular administrative process created by Congress is
preserved.
Section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act provides: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees. . . because [the employee] has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because [the employee] has made a charge. . . or
participated ... in an investigation, [or] proceeding. . . under
this subchapter.18 3 NLRA section 8(a)(4) declares that "[i]t shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to discharge or
79. Civil Rights Act § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). The Civil Rights Act
creates the right to be free from discrimination in employment based on race, sex, color,
religion, or national origin. The Act established the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) which assists aggrieved persons through conciliation or other remedial
action. An aggrieved person may, however, commence a civil action if he or she is unable
to obtain voluntary compliance with the law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). For a summary of
the procedures under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, see infra notes 94-98 and accompa-
nying text.
80. NLRA § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976). The NLRA is the primary source of
federal law governing labor-management relations in private industry. The basic NLRA
principles are found in § 7, which grants employees the right to form labor organizations,
to deal collectively through such organizations regarding terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and to engage in concerted activities in support of these rights. Unfair labor prac-
tices-certain acts committed by an employer or labor organization which interfere with
§ 7 rights-are monitored through quasi-judicial proceedings before the National Labor
Relations Board. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW-UNIONIZATION AND COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING 1-3 (1976).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976). The Fair Labor Standards Act was aimed at elimi-
nating labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of a minimum standard of living by
regulating wages and hours. Responsibility for its administration is placed with various
agencies, as well as with the courts. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152
(5th Cir. 1962) (held that plaintiff had been discriminutorily discharged but was not enti-
tled to reinstatement although damages could be awarded by lower court in lieu of rein-
statement); see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
82. In express terms, these statutes prohibit employer discrimination against an em-
ployee who files a charge. The term "employee," however, is not limited to individuals
standing in a present employer-employee relationship. "Employees" include former em-
ployees, employees of another employer, and job applicants. An employer who refuses to
hire a job applicant because of the applicant's affiliation with a labor union is guilty of an
unfair labor practice. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). The use of
racial coding for job applications discriminates against black applicants and violates Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975). Cf.
3 FRES 21:166-21:253. Provisions of the FLSA protect only those individuals employed by
an employer.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
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otherwise discriminate against an employee because [the em-
ployee] has filed charges or given testimony under this sub-
chapter."84 Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA states:
it shall be unlawful for any person. . . to discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any employee because such
employee has filed any complaint or instituted ... any pro-
ceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding or has served or is about
to serve on an industry committee.
85
According to the Supreme Court, the objective of NLRA sec-
tion 8(a)(4) is "to prevent the [National Labor Relations] Board's
channels of information from being dried up by employer intimi-
dation of prospective complainants and witnesses."86 Failure to
give full effect to the section would thwart the congressional de-
sign for "implementation of this country's labor policies."87 Simi-
larly, section 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act proscribes retaliation
and reprisal so that fear of discrimination or discharge will not
prevent an employee from filing a charge with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).88 Congress intended
that persons filing charges with the EEOC be free from retaliation,
"both to secure the rights of the charging party and to avoid chil-
ling the actions of others who might sue to implement the guaran-
tees of the Act."89 Section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA also was
designed to obviate employees' fears of economic retaliation
which might induce them to accept substandard employment con-
84. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
85. Id. § 215(a)(3) (1976).
86. NLRB v. Schrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972).
87. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967). For a thorough discus-
sion of § 8(a)(4), see R. GORMAN, supra note 80, at 142-43.
88. See Mead v. United State Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. 114 (D. Minn. 1977).
In Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960), the Court described the
problem:
[T]he value of such an [employee's] effort [in filing a complaint] may pale when
set against the prospect of discharge and the total loss of wages for the indetermi-
nate period necessary to seek and obtain reinstatement. Resort to statutory reme-
dies might thus often take on the character of a calculated risk, with restitution of
partial deficiencies in wages due for past work perhaps obtainable only at the cost
of irremediable entire loss of pay for an unpredictable period. Faced with such
alternatives, employees understandably might decide that matters had best be left
as they are. We cannot read the Act as presenting those it sought to protect with
what is little more than a Hobson's choice.
Id. at 292-93. Accord NLRB v. Schill Steel Prod., Inc., 480 F.2d 586, 594 (5th Cir. 1973);
NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326, 1348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926
(1972).
89. Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. 114, 132 (D. Minn.
1977).
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ditions in violation of the Act?0
Enforcement mechanisms for the three nondiscrimination pro-
visions vary. A NLRA section 8(a)(4) charge is initiated by filing
a claim in the office for the region in which the alleged wrongdo-
ing occurred.91 The Board, in its discretion, may decline to exer-
cise its full statutory and constitutional jurisdiction. 2 If the Board
declines to exercise its jurisdiction, state agencies and courts are
permitted to assume jurisdiction. 93
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an aggrieved person
may file a charge with the EEOC.94 The Commission then inves-
tigates the charge to determine whether there is reasonable cause
to believe that the charge is true.95 If reasonable cause exists, in-
formal conciliation is initiated to remedy the alleged unlawful
practice.96 Failure to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement
allows the Commission to bring suit in federal district court.97 If a
charge is dismissed by the Commission, the Commission does not
90. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Compliance with
the FLSA is dependent upon the information and complaints of employees seeking to vin-
dicate their rights, rather than on detailed federal supervision. Id. Effective information
could only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials without fear of reprisal
or discrimination. Id.
91. R. GoRMAN, supra note 80, at 7. The NLRB is prohibited from initiating its own
proceedings. Thus, implementation of the NLRA is dependent upon the initiative of indi-
viduals. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418
(1968).
92. Congress vested the NLRB with the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally
permissible under the commerce clause. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226
(1963). The Board has chosen not to exercise its power to its constitutional limit. Id.
Otherwise, its caseload would be unmanageable and attention would be diverted from the
more significant cases. See R. GORMAN, supra note 80, at 22. In 1959, Congress recog-
nized the Board's practice of limiting its caseload by enacting what is now codified at 29
U.S.C. 164(c)(1) (1976). Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 701(a), 73 Stat. 519,
541. This statute provides that: "[tihe Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or
by published rules... decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute.. . where, in
the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction.... The published jurisdictional
standards refer to minimum dollar amounts established by the Board.
Absent constitutional and statutory jurisdiction, the Board may assert jurisdiction over
an employer who has violated § 8(a)(4), since public policy requires that the Board exercise
jurisdiction, when an individual alleges interference with his or her statutory right to resort
to NLRB processes. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
199 N.L.R.B. 37 (1972).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1976).
94. Members of the Commission also may initiate charges themselves. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1976).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. § 2000e-5(0(l).
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file suit, or if an aggrieved party is dissatisfied with the pace of the
EEOC proceedings, the aggrieved party may file a private civil
action after receipt of a "right to sue" notice from the EEOC.98
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Secretary of Labor is
authorized to bring an action to recover unpaid minimum wages
or overtime compensation.99 This action may be brought without
an employee filing a written request"° and without joining as
plaintiff the employees on whose behalf suit is filed.' 0' Unlike its
counterparts in the NLRA and Civil Rights Act, the FLSA ex-
pressly gives private individuals the right to seek redress for sec-
tion 15 violations. 0 2
Remedies under the Civil Rights Act, the NLRA, and the
FLSA are essentially the same. The basic remedy, absent any loss
of employment or pay, is a cease and desist order.'03 In addition,
98. Id. All private approaches to the courts under Title VII will be preceded by re-
ceipt of "right-to-sue" notification from the EEOC. Id. These notices inform the claimant
of his or her right and commence the 90-day period during which suit may be brought by
an individual. See Holly v. Alliance Rubber Co., 380 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (N.D. Ohio
1974).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1976); see Wirtz v. Atlantic States Constr. Co., 357 F.2d 442
(5th Cir. 1966).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1976). The employee's consent to the Secretary of Labor's
institution of an action constitutes a waiver by the employee. Id.
101. See Mitchell v. Stewart Bros. Constr. Co., 184 F. Supp. 886 (D. Neb. 1960).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976 & Supp. 1979), now provides in part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this
title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may
be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any employer
who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such
legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of sec-
tion 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstate-
ment, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount
as liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of
the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a
public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one
or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves or other employees
similarly situated.
See also Bush v. State Indus., Inc., 599 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1979) (implied private right of
action under the FLSA).
103. Section 706(g) of title VII specifically gives the court the authority to "enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1976). The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that the federal district courts have juris-
diction for cause shown to restrain violations of provisions of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 217
(1976). See NLRB v. Schrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972) (cease and desist orders are routinely
entered upon proof of retailiatory conduct). In Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
442 F. Supp. 114 (D. Minn. 1977), the court found that a permanent injunction restraining
an employer from engaging in retaliatory actions imposes no undue hardship since it sim-
ply obligates the employer to comply with title VII's mandate to refrain from discriminat-
ing or interfering with an employee or applicant because that person exercised his or her
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an employer may be required to communicate the order to the
employees. Communication may consist of posting notice on the
work premises that an employer will not discriminate, 10 or order-
ing a high ranking official in the company to read the order at a
meeting attended by all employees during working hours.10 5 This
latter form of communication is one of the most effective means of
curbing the chilling effect on the exercise of employee rights since
it requires the source of the intimidation-the company-to an-
nounce cessation of its own illegal conduct. 0 6
If the employee was disciplined for filing charges, the em-
ployer also may be ordered to expunge the employee's personnel
records and other similar records of all adverse comments related
to the incident.0 7 Expungement is necessary to eliminate present
and future discriminatory effects of past retaliation.'0 " An order
to remove reprimands from the employee's file often accompanies
a cease and desist order.0 9
The remedy for refusing employment to a person who has filed
charges against the employer is an order requiring the employer to
offer the individual immediate employment in a position the
claimant is qualified to perform and to pay wages lost as a result
of the discrimination.' '0 Nevertheless, if the employee is dis-
charged under these circumstances and declines reinstatement,
statutory right. Id. at 134. Furthermore, the court found that the permanent injunction
protects the public interest in free and uninhibited access to the EEOC. Id.
104. See, e.g., Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. 114 (D. Minn.
1977); Sanford Dress Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1959).
105. See Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. 114 (D. Minn.
1977). Accord, EEOC v. Union Bank, 12 Fair Labor Empl. Prac. Cas. 527, 530 (D. Ariz.
1976) (employer ordered to deliver a copy of the court's findings of facts, conclusions of
law, and order to each employee); EEOC v. Midas, Inc., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 719, 721
(1974) (company required to communicate to each employee both orally and by written
statement the court's preliminary order). For a discussion of this remedy in the labor con-
text, see NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1941); Marine Welding &
Repair Works v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 395, 399 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, 470 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1972); Texas Gulf Sulpher Co. v. NLRB, 463 F.2d
778, 779 (5th Cir. 1972).
106. Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. at 135.
107. Id. at 136. See General Elec. Co., Automatic Blanket Plant, 155 N.L.R.B. 1365,
a'd, 367 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
108. See, e.g., Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. at 136 (em-
ployee discharged in retaliation for filing sex discrimination charges with the EEOC).
109, See supra note 107.
110. In the title VII context, see Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F.
Supp. 114 (D. Minn. 1977). In the labor context, see Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, Inc.,
155 N.L.R.B. 447 (1965); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 982 (1961). In the FLSA
context, see Bowe v. Judson C. Bums, Inc., 137 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943); Mitchell v. Stewart
Bros. Constr. Co., 184 F. Supp. 886 (D. Neb. 1960).
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both back pay and a cease and desist order will be ordered"I to
effectuate the purposes of the acts." 2 Uncertainties in determin-
ing what an employee would have earned but for the discrimina-
tion should be resolved against the employer, since the employer's
unlawful conduct created the necessity for a backpay judgment." 3
III. AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST
COERCION UNDER SECTION 51
The FELA claimant, unlike claimants under the NLRA, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the FLSA, receives inadequate protec-
tion against an employer's retaliation for pursuing the statutory
right to compensation. These analogous acts guarantee freedom
from reprisal against employees who resort to statutory processes
and remedies." 4 The FELA, however, provides no mechanism to
prevent employers from discouraging resort to FELA litigation
and using coercive tactics in negotiating a settlement; "the result is
an impermissible chill on rights created by Congress.""' 5 Any
chilling effect extends not only to all prospective FELA plaitiffs,
but to all employees and their families." 6 A private right of ac-
tion against coercion, therefore, is needed to ensure the FELA
claimant's unfettered right to recover fully damages for injuries
caused by employer negligence.
Judicial implication of private causes of action is rooted in the
ancient English common law doctrine that where there is a right,
there is a remedy. 17 This principle, recognized by the Supreme
Court as early as 1803,11 was used sparingly until the post-World
War II era, when the proliferation of federal regulatory legislation
prompted private litigants to assert implied private rights of action
to achieve statutory remedies.' ' A policy consideration support-
11. See California Footwear Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 37 (1958). Back pay is computed from
the date the employee would have been put back to work absent the employer's discrimina-
tion against him or her. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dyers, 180 F. Supp. 852 (S.D. Ala. 1960);
Nicky Chevrolet Sales, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 411 (1972).
112. See, e.g., California Footwear Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 37 (1958).
113. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211,260-61 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Mead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. at
134 (citing Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 1975)).
114. See supra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
115. Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 385 (W.D. Mich. 1970).
116. Id.
117. McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal
and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REv. 167 (1975).
118. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
119. McMahon & Rodos, supra note 117, at 167.
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ing the doctrine is that it may be the only means of effectuating
the policy expressed in a particular statute. 120 In addition, an im-
plied private right of action may encourage compliance with the
statute as victims could actively assist in enforcement' 2' and viola-
tors would face an additional penalty. 1
22
During the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme
Court utilized the implied rights doctrine to create private reme-
dies for violations under a broad spectrum of regulatory legisla-
tion. 23 The current Supreme Court test used to determine the
propriety of implying a private right of action, however, has
evolved under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren Burger. In
contrast to the Warren Court's philosophy, the Burger Court re-
flects a philosophy of judicial restraint and a reluctance to
broaden federal jurisdiction. 24
In determining whether to imply a private cause of action for
injunctive relief or damages under a statute not expressly author-
izing such a remedy, the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash 121 consid-
ered the following four factors:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted,". . .-that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indi-
cation of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff?. . . And finally, is the cause of ac-
tion one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?12 6
Four years later, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,' 27 the
120. Gamin & Eisberg, The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 UMKC L. REv. 292, 297-300
(1972). "The legislature cannot know a priori what difficulties will be encountered in the
enforcement of the provisions of a statute it enacts. Where enforcement is lax or otherwise
problematical, it would be a frustration of the policy expressed by the statute to refuse civil
relief to injured persons." Id. at 298.
121. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 285, 291 (1963).
122. Id.
123. See McMahon & Rodos, supra note 117, at 167.
124. Id. at 167-68. The authors stated that private right of action cases during the
Warren years reflected a willingness on the Court's part to go beyond the statute to create
private remedies that Congress had not expressed an intent to grant. Recent decisions
demonstrate a trend away from the Court's willing involvement in private disputes to pro-
mote social and statutory policies.
125. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
126. Id. at 78 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
127. 442 U.S. 560 (1978).
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Supreme Court clarified the Cort test. The opinion stated that the
four factors set forth in Cori were only relevant in determining
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly pro-
viding one. 12 The Touche Ross majority noted that Cort did not
decide that each factor was entitled to equal weight. Rather, the
central inquiry is whether Congress intended to create, either ex-
pressly or by implication, a private cause of action.129 The appro-
priate analysis for determining congressional intent, therefore, is
one of statutory construction focusing on the language of the stat-
ute, legislative history, and the statutory scheme of
enforcement. 3 0
The language of section 51 does not purport to create a private
action against employer coercion. The language instead addresses
the railroad's liability for injuries to employees which result from
its negligence. Moreover, the legislative history of section 51 does
not address the issue of private remedies for employer coercion.
The legislative history of a statute which does not expressly create
or deny a private remedy, however, typically will be silent or am-
biguous on the question. 3 '1 Therefore, Congress' failure to ex-
pressly consider a private remedy is not necessarily inconsistent
with the intent to make such a remedy available.132
The Touche Ross Court, however, warned against implying a
private right of action in the face of congressional silence.' 33
Thus, the language and legislative history of section 51 weigh
against implying a cause of action proscribing coercion.
The only provision of the FELA bearing on enforcement is
section 60 which prevents railroads from interfering with third-
party employees who testify in FELA actions. 134 There is no ex-
press remedy, however, for actual claimants when railroads inter-
fere with FELA rights. Thus, an action which provides relief to
claimants for employer coercion would appear to fit within the
FELA's scheme of enforcement.
128. Id. at 575.
129. Id. The Court rejected the notion that the implied rights doctrine should be in-
voked to effectuate the policy behind legislative enactments. Id. at 568, 575-76.
130. Id. at 575-76.
131. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (im-
plied private rights under the Investment Advisors Act); Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 694 (1978) (implied private rights under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act
recognized).
132. See Transamerica, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (requiring finding of affirmative intent).
133. 442 U.S. at 579.
134. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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Even though the scheme of enforcement does not seem to
weigh against implying a private action, the language and con-
gressional history do weigh against implication. Under a strict
Touche Ross analysis, therefore it appears unlikely that the
Supreme Court would imply a private right of action when
threats, coercion, or economic pressure effectively deter resort to
FELA or result in unjust settlements.
A different result may be reached, however, under the more
liberal Cor analysis followed in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago. 13  In the same term that Touche Ross was decided, the
Supreme Court held in Cannon that section 901(a) of Title IXI36
affords a private right of action, despite the absence of express
statutory authorization. Title IX, like the FELA, creates a distinct
federal right in a class of plaintiffs-women under Title IX, and
railroad employees under the FELA. The Supreme Court in
Touche Ross denied relief under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which is a regulatory statute unlike the FELA, which creates
a distinct right. Thus, in determining whether to imply a private
right of action, it appears that the Supreme Court will apply a
more liberal Cort test when the statute creates a distinct federal
right in the plaintiff' 3 7
Under Cort, the first inquiry is whether the statute was enacted
for the benefit of a special class of plaintiffs. The dispositive lan-
guage in section 51 provides that "every common carrier while
engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Terri-
tories. .. shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury
while he is employed by such carriers. . . , or, in the case of death
of such employee, to his or her personal representative . *... ,138
This language expressly identifies railroad employees and their
beneficiaries as the class Congress intended to benefit. Analysis
under the first Cort factor thus supports the implication of a pri-
vate right of action.
Applying the second Cort factor, the legislative history does
not explicitly address the availability of a remedy to FELA claim-
ants deprived of their full remedy or forum. The enactment of
sections 55 and 60 indicate, however, the drafters' implicit as-
135. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
137. Note, The Federal Securities Acts: The Demise ofthe Implied Private Rights Doc-
trine?, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 627, 647-48.
138. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976) (emphasis added).
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sumption that section 51 would be enforced. 139 Sections 51 and 60
were designed to eliminate the danger of coercion and retaliation
against railroad employees who testify in FELA actions, and em-
ployees and their beneficiaries who pursue an FELA claim. 4
Moreover, by precluding from FELA actions the common law de-
fenses of assumption of the risk, the fellow servant rule, and con-
tributory negligence the drafters intended section 51 to provide an
effective and readily available remedy for negligence-related inju-
ries in the railroad industry.' 4 ' The right to be free from intimida-
tion and coercion in pursuing the section 51 right is a necessary
legal incident of the statute.142 Thus the FELA's legislative his-
tory demonstrates that Congress implicitly understood section 51
as granting a private remedy against coercion to FELA claimants,
or their beneficiaries, who are denied FELA relief or who obtain
unjust settlements.
Under the third prong of Cont, a private remedy against coer-
cion is not only consistent with the underlying purpose of the leg-
islative scheme, but is demanded to effectuate the orderly
enforcement of the Act.' 43 The purpose and policy behind the
FELA is to promote adequate recovery for injured workers and
thereby promote railroad safety.'" Analogous federal employ-
ment statutes 145 indicate the need for a private action to ensure the
uninhibited exercise of the right to file a claim under section 51.
These statutes proscribe retaliation against claimants for exercis-
ing the rights guaranteed under the statutes.' 46 FELA claimants
have no such protection when pursuing their statutory remedy. Ef-
fective implementation and enforcement of section 51 depends on
the initiative of railroad employees or their beneficiaries. 147 Rail-
139. Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting): "I
am unwilling to assume that 'Congress simultaneously sought to protect a class and deprive
[it] of the means of protection' (quoting Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617,
623 (2d Cir. 1978).
140. The actual operation of these provisions falls short of their intended goal of pro-
tecting employees who wish to fully and freely pursue a FELA claim. See supra notes
48-64 and accompanying text.
141. See Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. at 383; supra notes 11-29 and
accompanying text.
142. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
143. Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1978). The Court re-
jected the notion that the implied rights doctrine should be invoked to effectuate the policy
behind legislative enactments.
144. See supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
147. The FELA is not self-executing. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
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road employees, like employees covered under the analogous fed-
eral employment statutes, occupy a vulnerable position.
Implication of a private right of action, therefore, is consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme, and will
assist FELA claimants in obtaining adequate compensation.
The final inquiry under Cort is whether a federal remedy is
inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area of basic
concern to the states. An FELA action is entirely a creature of
federal law.148 The Act creates federal rights protected by federal,
rather than local, rules of law. 149 Although a plaintiff may sue in
state court, federal law must be applied to achieve uniform appli-
cation of the act.' 50 In sum, a straightforward application of the
four Cort factors compels the implication of a private right of ac-
tion for FELA claimants denied their remedy or forced into set-
tling for an unjust amount by threats, coercion, or economic
pressure.
IV. MAKING OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE ONCE AN FELA
CLAIMANT HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT COERCION IS
ACTIONABLE
In determining whether employer conduct interfered with an
employee's FELA rights, the liability standards of analogous fed-
eral employment statutes' 5' should be analyzed. The National
Labor Relations Board, in an attempt to clarify the appropriate
NLRA standard, stated in Wright Line 5 2 that a statutory viola-
tion occurs when anti-union animus is a motivating factor in the
148. See supra note 33.
149. See Baily v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352 (1943).
150. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Norfolk S. R.R. v. Ferebee,
238 U.S. 269 (1915).
151. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (burden of persuasion on the issue of discriminatory intent in title
VII cases always remains with the plaintifi). Under the NLRA compare Nacker Packing
Co. v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 456, 463 (7the Cir. 1980) ("discharge is unlawful ... if it is moti-
vated, even in part, by a desire to discourage union activity") with Waterbury Community
Antenna, Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The magnitude of the impermissi-
ble ground is immaterial... as long as it was the 'but for' cause of the discharge"). For a
discussion of the employee's burden of proof under the NLRA, see Wolly, What Hath Mt.
Healthy Wrought, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 385 (1980). Under the FLSA, compare Mitchell v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 278 F.2d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 1960) (discriminatory discharge
found because employee would not have been discharged but for his admission of author-
ing a wage-hour complaint) with Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152, 153 (5th Cir.
1962) (discriminatory discharge when the firing was motivated in part by assertion of em-
ployee's statutory rights).
152. [1980] 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (251 NLRB No.150) 117,356.
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employer's decision to discharge an employee, and the action
would not have taken place absent the employee's protected activ-
ity.153 Under this standard, once a plaintiff has established a
prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his
conduct. 154
The First Circuit recently has clarified'55 the Wright Line ap-
proach to coincide with the Civil Rights Act Title VII standard
articulated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine.'56 In Burdine, the Court held that "when the plaintiff has
proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant bears
only the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory rea-
sons for its actions."'' 57 The Court also noted, that "[t]he defend-
ant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by
the proffered reasons."'15 1 Similarly, the First Circuit in NL. B v.
Wright Line I 9 held:
[Tihe only burden which may be acceptably placed on the em-
ployer is a "burden of production" . . . .The imposition of
this limited burden, however, does not shift to the employer the
burden of proving that an unfair labor practice has not oc-
curred .... Thus, the employer... has no more than the
limited duty of producing evidence to balance, not to outweigh,
the evidence produced by the general counsel.' 61
The First Circuit's clarification of the Wright Line approach
may be challenged, however, due to the more stringent require-
ments of establishing a prima facie case under the NLRA when
compared to the requirements under title VII.16 1 Under the
NLRA, the General Counsel must establish that the employer was
motivated by discriminatory intent. Under title VII, the plaintiff
must show only:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualification, he was rejected; and
(iv) that after his rejection the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
153. Id. at 32,466.
154. Id.
155. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
156. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
157. Id. at 260.
158. Id. at 254.
159. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
160. Id. at 904-05.
161. Id. at 906-07.
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plainants' qualifications. 162
Since under title VII the burden of showing a prima facie case is
lighter than under the NLRA, the burden necessary to rebut such
a showing is lighter.
Irrespective of the employer's burden, the elements necessary
to establish a prima facie case under the NLRA 163 lend them-
selves more readily to the situation likely to be encountered under
the FELA, than do those under title VII.'1 Title VII applies, with
certain exceptions, to all persons subject to sex discrimination. 65
Both the NLRA and the FELA, however, protect a specified class
of employees: the NLRA protects employees engaging in con-
certed activities; 66 the FELA protects railroad employees injured
due to their employer's negligence. As an incident to a claimant's
statutorily guaranteed rights under the FELA, as under the
NLRA, employer activity intended to discourage resort to statu-
tory rights should be actionable.
Thus, an FELA claimant must prove that intent to discourage
resort to FELA remedies was a motivating factor behind the em-
ployer's coercive activities. Upon this prima facie showing, the
employer must show that the same activities would have taken
place absent the employee's attempted resort to FELA rights.
This shifting burden of proof arguably should require then that
the employer not only meet the burden of production, but also
meet the burden of proving that the discriminatorily motivated
conduct did not occur.
V. APPROPRIATE REMEDIES
Remedies for interfering with the right to pursue an FELA
claim should substantially parallel remedies available under sec-
tions 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8(a)(4) of the National
Labor Relations Act, and 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 67 For example, a cease and desist order should issue, with a
notice posted stating that the employer will refrain from applying
pressure to FELA claimants to reach settlements. 68 If an em-
162. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 441 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
163. See Wright Line, f1980] 5 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) at 32,466.
164. See 441 U.S. at 802.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
166. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
167. For a discussion of these sections, see supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
168. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) (cease and desist order to remedy unfair labor
practice).
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ployee has been reprimanded for pursuing an FELA claim, the
employer should be ordered to remove the reprimand from the
employee's file. 169 Retaliatory discharge should be remedied by
reinstatement and back pay.170 Back pay should issue even
though an employee declines reemployment.' 7 1 Furthermore, a
permanent injunction may be necessary to protect free and unin-
hibited access to the courts-the forum responsible for enforcing
FELA claims. 172 In egregious cases, ' 73 the railroad company may
be ordered to orally communicate the court's orders to
employees.174
Contempt 75 and punitive damages provide remedies uniquely
appropriate to the implied right of action for employer coercion.
A railroad which willfully, wantonly, or recklessly disregards an
employee's statutorily guaranteed rights should be liable for puni-
tive damages. 176 Moreover, punitive damages may be especially
appropriate where actual damages are negligible177 or are impos-
sible to measure. 178 In these cases, punitive danages may deter
future wrongdoings and provide a recovery sufficient to induce
employees to enforce their rights judicially. 179 The policies under-
lying the award of punitive damages"O and the FELA 8  establish
the propriety of awarding such damages to injured railroad em-
ployees and their beneficiaries when employer coercion dis-
courages filing a lawsuit.
169. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) (similar remedy in labor context). For a discussion
of back pay see supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
171. See California Footwear Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 37 (1958).
172. See 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1976) (Labor Board empowered to issue injunctions).
173. Eg., Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. at 387 (coercive settlement
tactics appeared to be part of management policy).
174. For a discussion of these remedies and the policies underlying them see supra
notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
175. When railroads use coercive tactics to discourage employee resort to FELA litiga-
tion, every remedial weapon, including contempt will be available to ensure the uninhib-
ited exercise of federal rights. Kozar, 320 F. Supp. at 386 (dictum).
176. Id. at 353.
177. See, e.g., Wills v. TWA, 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
178. Actual damages may be incapable of measurement by a money standard when the
railroad's efforts do not produce an agreement or release. Punitive damages are measured
according to the degree of malice, wantonness, or oppression of the defendant's conduct
rather than in terms of harm or loss to the plaintiff. Kozar, 320 F. Supp. at 353.
179. Note, supra note 101, at 298.
180. The financial penalty imposed on a defendant is aimed at eliminating wrongful
conduct which is quasi-criminal in nature. See Kozar, 320 F. Supp. at 353.
181. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Judges and commentators have characterized the FELA as a
"futile Act' 8 2 and as an unjust and archaic method of compensa-
tion. 8 3 Courts confronting FELA cases have, therefore, devoted
considerable time and research toward understanding the Act's
true meaning. 8 4 These efforts lead to the conclusion that the
FELA was designed to promote adequate recovery for negligently
injured railroad workers and to thereby promote safety in the
highly hazardous railroad industry. Congress has mandated that
this policy of adequate recovery to injured workers should affect
every substantive and procedural aspect of FELA litigation.'
8 5
When coercive tactics are applied to FELA claimants, in contra-
vention of congressional policy and public policy, 8 6 a private
cause of action against such coercion should be available.
Such coercion, whenever and wherever it exists, is utterly
abhorent to our system of justice. It is an attempt to ignore the
courts and settle disputes in the arena of private affairs and
solely upon the basis of private power. The law is avoided as
being incompatible with private interests. This is nothing more
than a return to or continuation of the rule of the mighty, and
will inevitably involve the sacrifice of the rights of the weak.
18 7
JANE KESTENBAUM
182. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business ofthe Supreme Court at October Term, 1931,
46 HARv. L. REv. 226, 249 (1932):
The deepest significance of FELA cases is the proof they furnish of the futility of
the Act itself. When the process of interpretation and application after twenty-
five years still yields unabated litigation and reveals an apparent growing inability
upon the part of the judges primarily trusted with its administration to know its
meaning, surely the legislation has proven a failure.
183. Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
184. See, e.g., Kozar, 320 F. Supp. at 387.
185. Id.
186. The district court inKozar, quoting from Pittsburgh, C., C., 7 St. L. Ry. v. Kinney,
95 Ohio 64, 68, 115 N.E.2d 505, 507 (1916), stated:
[Public policy] may be said to be the community common sense and common
conscience, extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public
morals, public health, public safety, public welfare, and the like. It is that general
and well-settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow
men, having due regard to all the circumstances of each particular relation and
situation.
Id. at 387-88.
187. Id. at 385.
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